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1. We argue that: 
 
• in their application to non-human animals, 'welfare' and 'well-being' are 
interchangeable words; and that 
 
• good welfare/well-being is the state of being manifest in an animal when its 
nutritional, environmental, health, behavioural and mental needs are met. 
 
2. These latter are essentially the 'five freedoms' formulated by the Farm Animal Welfare 
Council of the United Kingdom. 
 
3. Using the five freedoms as a basis, we have developed a system for assessing the impact of 
a proposed animal experiment or usage.  The freedoms are now transformed into 'domains 
of potential compromise' and are redefined better to emphasise the extent of welfare 
compromise rather than the ideal of absence of compromise.  Domain 1 is 
Thirst/hunger/malnutrition, 2 is Environmental challenge, 3 is Disease/injury/functional 
impairment, 4 is Behavioural/interactive restriction, and domain 5 is 
Anxiety/fear/pain/distress.  A proposal would be examined systematically in all domains, 
and the degree of compromise in each rated on a 5-step non-numerical scale - O, A, B, C, 
X.  Anxiety/fear/pain/distress arising from compromise in domains 1-4 would be 
cumulated into domain 5.  The overall rating would commonly be that given  to domain 5, 
but if this were low or unknown, it would be given to the highest rating in the other 
domains. 
 
4. The proposer would be required to present to the institutional Animal Ethics Committee 
his/her assessment of the impact of a proposed experiment on the animals involved, 
together with an appropriate justification for the work and a cost-benefit analysis. 
 
5. The extent of the justification required for a proposal would be directly related to the 
severity of compromise expected, being low for grade O and very high for grade X. 
 
6. The cost-benefit decision would be based on the balance between the expected severity 
of welfare compromise and the expected benefits set out in the justification. 
 
7. The major advantage of this system for assessing the impact on welfare is that it 
encourages systematic consideration of all sources of possible compromise.  Such wider 
consideration would allow more accurate assessment of the severity of impact and thereby 
would improve the validity and efficiency of cost-benefit analyses. 
 
8. The philosophical background to our approach is outlined, graded examples of welfare 
compromise are given and ethical and practical implications of using the system are 
discussed. 
 
9. We also set out what we consider to be the ethical and practical responsibilities of the 
researcher to the animals, and to his/her assistants.  The conscientiousness and 
comprehensiveness of the assessments of welfare compromise and the actions taken to 
minimise it are measures of the researcher's acceptance of ethical responsibility for all 









As judged by the extent to which we can now manipulate or control body processes 
effectively, the pursuit of animal-based science has been very successful and holds great 
promise for further advances in the future.  Animal-based science includes all fundamental or 
applied biologies concerned with humans and other animals, such as:  
 
• biologies dealing with human recreation or performance 
• biomedical and veterinary preventive or therapeutic interventions 
• food and fibre production by domesticated or wild animals 
• the mechanisms underlying normal body function and behaviour patterns 
• the conservation and management of endangered or exotic species 
• the eradication or control of pest animals. 
 
Despite its demonstrable success during this century animal-based science - in common with 
science in general - has been largely two-dimensional.  The first dimension resides in the 
acquisition of knowledge and the second dimension in the application of that knowledge for 
human ends.  There is, however, a third dimension (Figure 1).  It is the ethical implications of 
the modes of acquisition and use of scientific knowledge.  Although this third dimension has 
in fact been an implicit part of the conduct of science, it has been commonly ignored by 
scientists who mostly considered ethical issues to be beyond the realm of their legitimate 
concern.  As a consequence evaluations of ethical issues have effectively remained outside 
science, being left mainly to philosophers and theologians to pursue.  That is as true of 
animal-based science in particular as it is of science in general. 
 
We hold the view that it is only by the explicit inclusion of this ethical third dimension in our 
pursuit and application of scientific knowledge that particular sciences (and their 
practitioners) will be able to retain vitality, credibility and relevance to the times in which we 
live.  That is especially true for animal-based science at present.  It is currently subject to 
radical, sophisticated and fundamental questioning of the ethical justifications for most of its 
activities involving other animals (see Singer, 1990 Sapontzis, 1990; Rollin, 1990), a 
questioning which reflects contemporary concerns about animal welfare, especially the 
welfare of animals used in agriculture and science.  That questioning, which we believe to be 
both necessary and beneficial for the advancement of all animal-based science, is largely 
responsible for the existence of ANZCCART and the interest generated by the present 
conference on the well-being of animals in the research environment. 
 
Animal Welfare Science - the science concerned with the acquisition and application of the 
knowledge required to define, maintain, restore and promote animal welfare (Mellor, 1992) - 
provides an excellent vehicle for demonstrating, exploring and developing aspects of the 
ethical third dimension of animal-based science, as illustrated by some recent publications 
(Rollin and Kesel, 1990; Tannenbaum, 1991; Kuchel, Rose and Burrell, 1992; Porter, 1992; 
Sandoe and Simonsen, 1992; Stamp Dawkins and Gosling, 1992).  The intersection of science 
and ethics in the animal welfare arena therefore offers opportunities both to advance the 
interests of animals and to demonstrate the importance of introducing consideration of values 
if the  continuing credibility of animal-based science is to be safeguarded. 
 
 
HEALTH-ILLNESS CONTINUUM AND WELFARE-SUFFERING CONTINUUM 
 
The state of being of an animal, whether human or not, varies over a range.  Good health, 
characterised by high levels of both affective and functional competence, is located at one end 
of this range, and extreme illness, characterised by severe affective and functional compromise 
with death imminent, is located at the other end (Dunn, 1961).  Between these two - good 
health and extreme illness - lies a continuum of states (Figure 2a).  Those states are usually 
described either in terms of the extent of movement away from good health, i.e. the degrees 
of loss of good health, or in terms of the extent of movement towards good health away from 
states of compromised health, i.e. the degrees of regained good health (Figure 2b).  Clearly our 
usual focus is on good health as such, the preservation of good health or the restoration of 
good health in all its dimensions. 
 
To emphasise this point it is worth noting that the same continuum of states can be 
described with semantic consistency, but less appeal, by using extreme illness as our 
reference point.  Thus, we could speak in terms of 'degrees of compromise to extreme illness' 
to indicate stages of what we would usually refer to as 'recovery', or about the 'acquisition of 
extreme illness' to denote the appearance of very severe compromise (Figure 2c).  The low 
appeal of this approach arises because it has the unsatisfying outcome of being expressed in 
terms which focus on the opposite of our implicit or explicit desire to have and retain good 
health.  Hence the state of good health would need to be expressed - absurdly - in terms of 
having or retaining 'totally nullified illness'. 
 
An important point underlies this apparent absurdity.  Health is defined, implicitly or 
explicitly, by what it is not, by its opposite.  So too is illness.  We cannot know what we mean 
by health without implicit or explicit reference to illness.  We cannot know what we mean by 
illness without implicit or explicit reference to health.  Furthermore, as absolute concepts the 
two - good health and extreme illness - cancel each other out.  Thus, health and illness are 
mutually defining and mutually exclusive concepts. 
 
As indicated above we also recognise different degrees of health and illness.   A corollary of 
the above reasoning is that within the health-illness continuum representing the states 
between good health and extreme illness, as health declines illness must increase, and 
conversely, as illness decreases health must increase (Figure 3).  That is supported by 
observation.  For instance, in cases of mild illness impairment is usually confined to one or 
only a few areas of the body, leaving the rest of it largely unaffected, whereas marked debility 
can involve compromise to many body systems resulting from widespread primary impairment 
or from major primary impairment of one vital system. 
 
Thus, at different times an animal, be it human or not, exhibits different balances between 
good health and extreme illness, those balances being represented by different positions 
within the health-illness continuum.  
 
The purpose of the above analysis is to indicate that, as with the term 'health', our present 
use of the term 'welfare' (or 'well-being') carries with it 
 
(1) reference to that state as an absolute juxtaposed implicitly or explicitly with its 
opposite of, say, 'suffering' (Figure 4a), 
(2) recognition of a continuum of states which lies between the two opposite extremes 
(Figure 4a), 
(3) a mode of expression regarding that continuum which indicates our inherent bias 
towards or preference for one of its extremes (i.e. welfare) (Figure 4b), and 
(4) characterisation of that continuum such that as welfare declines suffering increases, 
and vice versa (Figure 4c). 
 
Different features of the welfare-suffering continuum will be considered below. 
 
 
WELFARE AND WELL-BEING 
 
We regard the terms 'welfare' and 'well-being' as interchangeable - they both refer to good 
states of being, physical and mental, of animals.  [Welfare: well-being, happiness, health, 
prosperity, etc.  Well-being:  state of being well, healthy, contented, etc. (Concise Oxford 
English Dictionary - 8th Ed.)]  A current distinction made between the two (Fraser, 1992), 
wherein well-being refers to endogenous states of being within an animal and welfare refers 
to human interventions designed to promote good well-being, makes the use of these terms 
unnecessarily complicated and potentially confusing, especially for lay people.  That practice 
seems to confer little benefit, especially as precise reference to 'human promotion of welfare' 
or to 'welfare promotion' avoids confusion and at the same time retains a useful synonym for a 
good state of being.  Our consistent use of the terms welfare and well-being as synonyms in 
this paper reflects this view. 
 
 
WELFARE AND SUFFERING 
 
When applied to animals, including humans, the term 'welfare' (or 'well-being') usually 
denotes an absence of 'suffering' or an absence of what might be argued are major 
components of suffering - i.e. anxiety, fear, pain and distress.  That word usage seems to be 
especially prevalent in the research context where our objective is to minimise the cost to 
other animals of their use in experiments.  Suffering of almost any sort is taken to represent 
an unpleasant, undesired state of being which is the outcome of the impact on the animal of 
noxious stimuli, whatever their origin or type.  A wide variety of circumstances can lead to 
suffering and suffering takes many forms.  Suffering can be acute or chronic, it or its 
components can have a range of intensities, it can manifest predominantly as anxiety or fear 
or pain or distress or different combinations of these phenomena, and the body responses can 
be mainly physical, largely mental or both physical and mental. 
 
The diversity of both the sources and expressions of suffering, and their apparent 
quantifiability, help explain the common use of levels of suffering as a major criterion for 
attempts to assess the acceptability to us, on the basis of the anticipated cost to the animals, 
of their use in experiments (Bateson, 1986; Fraser, 1990; CCAC, 1991; Porter, 1992; Reid and 
Mellor, 1993).  Nevertheless there is a danger that with our focus largely on suffering we could 
overlook a broader view of welfare (or well-being) which may be more informative and 
safeguard more effectively the interests of the animals in the experimental environment.  It 
would be useful therefore to devise a system which aids broad consideration of all potential 
sources of suffering in order to reduce the risk of making significant omissions when 
evaluating the possible untoward consequences for the animals of proposed experiments.  
Such breadth is included in the concept of the 'five freedoms' formulated by the Farm Animal 
Welfare Council (FAWC, 1992) of the United Kingdom (Table 1).  The five freedoms not only 
include specific reference to distress, fear and pain, but also highlight a range of factors which 
individually or collectively can lead to suffering.  They are thirst, hunger and malnutrition, 
environmental discomfort, injury and disease, and thwarted behavioural expression.  We 
consider that with some recasting the five freedoms could form the basis of a system for 
evaluating more comprehensively the ethical cost of experiments. 
 
Although so far in this section we have emphasised evaluations of suffering, use of the five 
freedoms clearly allows simultaneous assessments of major dimensions of welfare.  Two 
important consquences follow.  First, a more comprehensive description of good welfare/well-
being can be taken to include states of being which are manifest when the nutritional, 
environmental, health, behavioural and mental needs of the animals are satisfied.  Secondly, 
a more exact definition of the actual state of welfare of an animal becomes possible by 
reference to the extent of compromise of those needs. 
 
 
SENTIENCE AND CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
There are two preconditions of both welfare and suffering which are of significance in the 
research environment.  They are 'sentience' and 'consciousness'.  Their significance is easier 
to comprehend by dealing with suffering first.  It is axiomatic that without sentience there can 
be no feeling by the senses and without consciousness sentient animals cannot suffer.  It 
follows that sentience and consciousness are also preconditions of welfare, because without 
them there can be no perception of states of faring well or of states without suffering.  
Accordingly, in these terms the welfare of non-sentient animals cannot be compromised 
because they are incapable of suffering.  The same applies to sentient animals while they are 
unconscious, but clearly in that case welfare can be compromised before consciousness is lost 
and/or when or if consciousness returns.  Animals must therefore have the capacity to suffer 
- through both sentience and consciousness - before it is possible for their welfare (or well-
being) to be compromised. 
 
These arguments are quite separate from any theoretical or practical difficulties we might 
encounter when attempting to determine which animals are and are not sentient, whether or 
not there are different levels of sentience, and which animals do and do not exhibit 
consciousness (Rollin, 1990; Porter, 1992). 
 
 
WELFARE COMPROMISE IN RESEARCH 
 
Although in some cases experiments involve very little intrusion into an animal's usual mode 
of living (e.g. benign nutritional trials or behavioural observations in the field), most research 
on animals involves erosion, to a lesser or greater extent, of one or more of the five freedoms.  
Accordingly the ideal of the five freedoms as goals for achieving good animal welfare  on farms 
and elsewhere may be seen as inevitably compromised to some degree by the very nature of 
some, probably most, uses of animals in research.  Defining what we mean by the term animal 
welfare (or well-being) as it applies in the research environment therefore needs to refer not 
so much to how good the welfare of research animals is, but more to how much their welfare 
is compromised.  That emphasis highlights two ethical duties which are noted as major 
objectives of ANZCCART: (1) our duty to minimise the extent of welfare compromise to 
experimental animals and (2) our duty to maximise the benefits, however conceived, of 
animal-based research.  Having recognised the first of those duties, we are faced with 
determining what we consider to be acceptable and unacceptable levels of welfare 
compromise, and that in its turn depends to some extent on how we seek to satisfy the 
second duty of maximising the benefits of animal-based research. 
 
The acceptability of any welfare compromise will depend on a cost-benefit analysis which, if it 
is to be credible, must involve a comprehensive assessment of the negative impact of the 
experiments on the animals.  In such cost-benefit analyses the emphasis we give the 
interests of the animals compared to that accorded the anticipated benefits of the work will 
reveal our underlying ethical position regarding our use of other animals for human purposes.  
In recent years that emphasis has shifted towards the animals and away from our purposes in 
using them.  Examples of ethical positions which embody an asymmetry favouring the 
interests of the research animals themselves include the following: a commitment to 
minimising the debt we owe animals for their contributions to our quality of life (Mellor, 1988); 
a commitment to a 'Schweitzerian' ideal of avoiding harming animals whenever possible, 
leading to a restraining tension between that ideal and the perceived need to use some 
research animals for the wider benefit of humans and/or other animals (Porter, 1992); a 
commitment, at the very least, to maximise the interests of other animals which continue to 
be used in invasive research during a hoped for and actively promoted transition to the 
eventual complete disappearance of such animal use (Rollin, 1990). 
 
Systems for determining different levels of welfare (or well-being) are an important aid to 
these deliberations (e.g. Fraser, 1990; CCAC, 1991; Reid and Mellor, 1993).  If different levels of 
welfare could not be identified, we could not grade the extent of welfare compromise, nor 
conduct a cost-benefit analysis of particular research proposals, and nor could we act to 
improve the welfare (or well-being) of animals used for research or for other purposes.  
Presented below for your consideration is a system, based broadly on the principles embodied 
in the five freedoms, designed to assist with these endeavours. 
 
 
GRADING WELFARE COMPROMISE 
 
There are two main features of the grading system we propose.  They are (1) five domains of 
potential welfare compromise and (2) a severity scale applied to each domain. 
 
Domains of Potential Welfare Compromise 
 
The grading system highlights five overlapping domains of welfare, expressed not as freedoms 
but in terms which emphasise welfare compromise (Figure 5).  The welfare compromise, if any, 
caused by a particular experiment may occur in one or more of these five domains, which are: 
 
   Domain 1: Thirst/hunger/malnutrition 
   Domain 2: Environmental challenge 
   Domain 3: Disease/injury/functional impairment 
   Domain 4: Behavioural/interactive restriction 
   Domain 5: Anxiety/fear/pain/distress. 
 
Reference to these five domains can help us to assess and then minimise untoward 
consequences of experiments on animals in three main ways.  First, they draw attention to 
the wide range of general needs animals have and to our duty to ensure as far as is 
practicable that those needs are met throughout the experiment, from the time the animals 
are acquired to the time they are disposed of, alive or dead, at the end of the experiment.  
Secondly, they indicate areas where welfare compromise can occur which are not the primary 
focus of the experiment.  Thus, by reminding us not to concentrate exclusively on the 
particulars of a proposed experimental procedure they help us to broaden our awareness and 
thereby to avoid overlooking related areas where compromise may occur as well.  Thirdly, they 
provide a basis for assessing the extent of compromise in the welfare domain(s) which is(are) 
the primary focus of the experiment. 
 
The following important interactions between the five domains should be noted (Figure 5). 
 
1. Compromise in the first four domains (thirst/hunger/malnutrition; environmental 
challenge; disease/injury/functional impairment; behavioural/interactive 
restriction) will usually be registered in welfare terms in the fifth domain 
(anxiety/fear/pain/distress) which represents the components of suffering. 
 
2. Although anxiety/fear/pain/distress, if they occur, would usually be a product of 
manipulations directed at the other four domains (as just stated), 
anxiety/fear/pain/distress can themselves be the primary focus of some 
experiments. 
 
3. The final grading of welfare compromise would therefore usually be done by 
reference to the intensities and durations of anxiety/fear/pain/distress as likely 
outcomes of manipulations. 
 
4. In cases where the intensities and durations of anxiety/fear/pain/distress caused 
by particular mainpulations are not known or cannot be evaluated, the grading of 




The grading system also employs a severity scale to help assess the degrees of compromise 
within each of the five domains of welfare.  The  scale in not numerical.  That avoids the 
apparent precision of arithmetic assessments whereby arbitrary numerical thresholds and 
manipulations can be used as substitutes for reasoned judgement (Reid and Mellor, 1993). 
 
The severity scale consists of five grades - O, A, B, C and X - repesenting increasingly severe 
compromise.  By aiding comprehensive assessments of the degrees of intrusiveness of 
proposed experiments, the scale is designed to help estimate the different levels of the 
associated ethical cost (see below). 
 
The grading system as a whole is presented in Table 2.  In it we have attempted to 
characterise the severity scale, descriptively and with examples, for each of the five domains 
of welfare.  We see this as a provisional attempt - not a final system - which with feedback 
from others could be developed further.  Terms such as 'minor', 'moderate', 'marked' and 
'severe' purposely have not been defined - it is for the experimenter to determine their 
meaning in the particular context of each procedure.  Furthermore, the examples presented 
are not exhaustive, they are illustrative.  Nor are the examples definitive - we expect that the 
grading of some or many of them is likely to initiate debate.  That is to be encouraged because 
an important purpose of the system is to stimulate thought about the severity of different 
experiments.  Finally, the grading assigned to many procedures is likely to change as our 




USING THE GRADING SYSTEM 
 
Each Severity Grade Must Reflect the State of the Animal at the Time of Maximum 
Impact 
 
When assigning a severity grade in each of the five domains of potential welfare compromise, 
the grade must refer to the summed impacts of both the initial state of the animal and the 
induced effect of the experimental procedure, not to the induced effect alone.  Two examples 
serve to illustrate this distinction. 
 
(1) With studies of diseases as they occur spontaneously, it might be argued that the 
researcher did not cause the disease and therefore that the degree of intrusiveness 
assigned to the experiment should refer only to the effects of what the researcher does to 
study such diseases.  This would result in the grading of experimental studies of 
spontaneous diseases often being less severe than the grading of the same diseases 
reproduced for study in the laboratory. 
 
(2) By the same reasoning, studies on the farm of pain/distress caused by routine tissue 
removals for husbandry purposes (e.g. castration, tailing, dehorning) which are conducted 
without anaesthesia as part of the usual schedule of farm activities, would be assigned 
lower severity ratings than would laboratory studies of the same procedures conducted on 
animals which would otherwise not have been so treated. 
 
Such reasoning neglects our ethical responsiblility as custodians of the animals in our control 
to intervene when that is necessary and possible.  The act of experimenting requires some 
form of access to the animals under study, where ever they may be located, and that provides 
the opportunity to intervene to treat the treatable, to palliate suffering or, as a final option, to 
euthanase severely compromised animals.  If we choose not to intervene in such ways in 
order to achieve particular experimental objectives, our choice may be seen as equivalent to 
the act of our creating the entire conditions of the experiment ourselves.  Accordingly, the 
grading of the degrees of welfare compromise during an experiment should not be affected by 
whether the phenomena under study have been created for study in the laboratory or have 
arisen spontaneously (e.g. diseases states) or during other common uses of animals (e.g. 
husbandry tissue removals). 
 
The question arises as to whether there are any circumstances where the initial condition of 
the animal can be given less prominence and the induced effects of a procedure used as the 
primary basis for a grading.  We think not. 
 
It is important to make a clear distinction between the full extent of welfare compromise 
experienced by the animals under study and the reasons for studying the conditions which 
produce that compromise.  The former is what is graded in the five domains of potential 
welfare compromise.  The latter represents the justification for the study.  However, that 
justification - which could include attempts to reduce the incidence of spontaneously 
occurring diseases or a desire to minimise the pain/distress of the routine husbandry 
procedures applied to farm animals - might not need to be as strong when studying 'pre-






Each Experiment Must be Graded in All Five Domains of Potential Welfare Compromise 
 
The overall grading of an experiment would usually be that assigned to the components of 
suffering (anxiety, fear, pain, distress) - the fifth domain.  However, the combined use of all 
five domains of potential welfare compromise is necessary to help ensure that all factors 
which can contribute to suffering of different kinds have been assessed.  When assessing 
compromise in each domain care must be taken to avoid inclusion of compromise to the 
features of welfare dealt with in the other domains.  The greatest anticipated compromise 
should be used when assigning the grade in each domain.  When compromise in two or more 
domains contributes to suffering, assigning an appropriately higher grade to the area of 
anxiety/fear/pain/distress should be considered.  The process of determining the overall 
grade is illustrated by the following five examples.  The first shows that in the absence of 
suffering the highest grade in one of the other areas becomes the overall grade.  In the next 
three examples the overall grade is the same as that assigned to the components of suffering, 
and in the last example the grade in domain 5 is greater than any of the individual grades 




1. Operant conditioning with positive reinforcement using animals accustomed to the 




 1. Fluid/food intake unaffected   Grade O 
 2. Thermoneutral environment   Grade O 
 3. Healthy, uninjured animals     Grade O 
 4. Minor behavioural restriction    Grade A 
 5. No suffering       Grade O 
 
       Overall grade: A 
 
2. Studies of limited gut resection (removal) and its consequences. 
 
 1. Fluid/food intake affected slightly    Grade A 
 2. Thermoneutral environment   Grade O 
 3. Anaesthesia plus surgery with effective analgesia  Grade B 
 4. Minor behavioural restriction (indoor individual pen) Grade A 
 5. Moderate pain/distress (mainly with surgery)  Grade B 
 
       Overall grade: B 
 
3. Blood sampling of recently confined and untamed free-range domesticated animals 
with strong flight responses. 
 
 1. Fluid/food intake affected slightly (reduced for first 48 h) Grade A 
 2. Thermoneutral environment   Grade O 
 3. Simple venipuncture of healthy uninjured animals Grade A 
 4. Mild behavioural restriction (handling, large indoor pen) Grade A 
 5. Marked fear/distress (mainly from handling/restaint) Grade C 
 
       Overall grade: C 
 
4. Studies of usually fatal viral diarrhoea in hand reared newborn animals. 
 
 1. Fluid/food intake moderately affected   Grade B 
 2. Thermoneutral environment   Grade O 
 3. Extreme debility or functional compromise  Grade X 
 4. Minor behavioural restriction    Grade A 
 5. Severe pain/distress (mainly from gut effects)  Grade X 
 
       Overall grade: X 
 
5. Studies of underfed animals exposed to severe cold for a short period (24 h). 
 
 1. Food intake restricted to cause weight loss of 20%   Grade B 
 2. Cold challenge at the limit of animal's adaptive response Grade B 
 3. Mild functional impairment     Grade A 
 4. Mild behavioural restriction (indoor individual pen) Grade A 
 5. Marked overall distress (from underfeeding and cold) Grade C 
 




In all five domains we have attempted to distinguish between the different grades using 
features which are measureable.  At worst the distinctions will be as crude as 'absent' or 
'present', or 'small' or 'big', but even imprecise distinctions are a form of quantification.  In 
such cases there would be a clear need to seek better indices.  At best, and mostly, 
measureable parameters with numerical scales are available for use (Mellor, 1992), although 
particular care is required when attempting to quantify the components of suffering (e.g. 
Chapman, 1992; Gebhardt, 1992; Manteca and Deag, 1993; Mason and Mendl, 1993; 
Wemelsfelder, 1993).  Whatever scales are adopted, there will be a clear need to continually 
review their usefulness in terms of the information they provide, their ability to discriminate 
between the different levels of severity and their practicality.  Later papers at this conference 
contribute to the subject of measureable indices of welfare status. 
 
Difficulties in Grading Severity 
 
Great care must be taken to consider all possible outcomes of a proposed experiment, in the 
long term as well as the short term.  Assigning a single impact rating for a group of animals 
involved in a given experiment ignores the posssibility of individual variation in animal 
responses - for instance, some individuals may suffer heat loss more than others, or socially 
dominant animals may consume a disproportionately large amount of the food offered to a 
group.  Other difficulties may also arise.  In field observations of animal behaviour, Cuthill 
(1991) notes the need to consider the possible effects of a field experiment on species other 
than the target animal; he also points out that even apparently benign food supplementation 
can have strongly deleterious consequences.  Most problems of this nature can be avoided by 
a good understanding of the interactions between the animals involved and their biological 
and physical environments.  More difficult is the problem of predicting the outcome of highly 
dynamic situations such as excessive inter- or intra-specific aggression - the need for such 
experiments requires very careful examination and, if permitted, they should be given a high 





In order to conduct a cost-benefit analysis for an experiment, each grade of the severity scale 
must represent a defined level of ethical cost and a required level of justification.  Without 
appropriate justification a proposed experiment would not be approved by an institutional 
Animal Ethics Committee and therefore could not legally be carried out.  As the ethical cost 
rises, clearly so also must the stringency and strength of justifications for carrying out the 
proposed research (Figure 6).  Grading the extent of compromise in all five domains is 
important because  it is only if we have comprehensively evaluated the full extent of all 
proposed intrusions that we can assess fully the acceptability of a justification for a proposed 
experiment. 
 
The ethical cost and the required justification for each grade on the severity scale are 
outlined in Table 3.  The following points should be noted. 
 
1. The justification for O graded experiments would not need to be in terms of 
benefits to humans, other animals or both. 
 
2. Both indirect and direct benefits would be acceptable for justifying A graded 
experiments, whereas usually only direct benefits could be used to justify 
experiments graded B, C or X. 
 
 The question of the meaning of the terms 'indirect benefits' and 'direct benefits' 
has been left open purposely.  These terms have been introduced to highlight the 
need for the experimenter to consider as part of the justification whether the 
contribution the proposed work is likely to make will be fundamental (Will the work 
simply increase understanding?), strategic  (Is it likely to help solve a problem in 
the medium to long term?) or applied (Will the results contribute immediately to 
solving a problem?). 
 
3. Proposed experiments in all the grades A to X would be disallowed if adequate 
justification were not provided. 
 
4. Grade X is included to make explicit the upper limits of acceptable experiments, 
where the most exceptional justification would be required for such experiments 
to proceed. 
 
5. The question of what the terms 'justification', 'good justification', 'strong 
justification' and 'most exceptional justification' mean has also been left open 
purposely.  The researcher will need to assign each proposed experiment to one of 
these categories and test the specific justification for it with colleagues and the 
institutional Animal Ethics Committee.  In that way a consensus will develop.  We 
may expect that consensus to change with time as knowledge and societal 
attitudes advance. 
 
The interdependence of the assessed impact on the animals of a proposed study and the 
justification for the proposal when making cost-benefit decisions is plain (see also: Bateson, 
1986; Porter, 1992).  Even under the best circumstances cost-benefit decisions can be difficult 
to make.  Clearly, when we approve any experiment graded higher than O we decide that the 
reasons for the study outweigh the graded cost to the animals.  Thus the interests of the 
animals which are to be used are subordinated to our purposes in using them.  Therein lies a 
danger.  Even when the present system for grading welfare compromise is used to make such 
decisions, we must remain aware that the necessary and repeated subordination of the 
experimental animals' interests to our own purposes in the research context could 
desensitise us to the true cost to those animals.  That would be the opposite outcome to the 
one we seek in proposing the present system.  One means of avoiding that desensitisation 
would be for us (experimenter and Committee) to reflect on the futility of each proposed study 
and the associated needless suffering (as graded) that would be caused if the desired animal 
usage, when carried out, were to fail.  That process would have the further advantage of re-
emphasising that the experimental design of each proposal must be capable of answering the 





Researchers are ethically responsible as individuals for the experiments they conduct on animals.  
Assessing thoroughly the intrusiveness or severity of any proposed experiment is an 
important step in exercising that responsibility.  Such an assessment is not a trivial matter to 
be dealt with casually as an administrative obstacle that must be overcome before the 
proposed work can proceed.  Nor can this responsibility be delegated to institutional Animal 
Ethics Committees.  Those committees may provide guidance on the acceptability of severity 
gradings and the associated justifications for the work, and they do regulate the experimental 
activities according to the law, but the ethical responsibility for each experiment remains 
primarily with the researcher.  Accordingly the onus is on the researcher to justify every 
aspect of a proposed experiment, including its scientific quality and significance. 
 
Researchers are ethically bound to minimise the severity of every experiment.  Once it has been 
decided that animals do need to be used (i.e. replacement is not appropriate) and the general 
features of the proposed experiments have been determined, active steps must then be taken 
to refine or modify the protocols to try to reduce their anticipated impact.  Although 
refinement should be attempted with all experiments graded more severely than O, there is a 
particular obligation to do so with experiments graded C or X.  For instance, with X graded 
experiments where the predicted end point for conscious animals is extreme 
debility/incapacity or an unpleasant death, attempts must be made to discover and use more 
humane end points.  Indeed, it can be argued that institutional Animal Ethics Committees 
should not approve such experiments, however exceptional their justification, unless a 
specific part of the protocol is designed to devise a more humane end point  The particular 
purpose of such a stricture would be to make it mandatory to try to reduce the severity rating 
of subsequent similar work.  Early euthanasia or the use of sedatives, for example, might 
reduce a severity grade for such work from X to C or B. 
 
Researchers' responsibilities continue throughout the period of animal use and beyond.  During 
experiments, throughout the period from acquisition to disposal of the animals, the 
researcher has total responsibility for all aspects of the animals' care, maintenance and use, 
whatever support may be provided by institutional or other services.  The best available 
methods at the highest standards of use must be employed .  Regular monitoring of welfare 
status is also imperative.  Furthermore, there is an obligation at the end of an experiment to 
use the experience gained to reassess all aspects of the work in order to (1) seek avenues to 
reduce the severity of the procedures used and, if appropriate, (2) to regrade the experiment 
up or down the severity scale.  Any such regrading and the reasons for it should be reported 
to the institutional Animal Ethics Committee to assist its future deliberations.  We regard 
feedback to the Animal Ethics Committee as critical to the process of building up a pool of 
experience for the Committee (and others) to draw upon (Reid and Mellor, 1993). 
 
Researchers are responsible for providing training and advice to all novices, including 
inexperienced scientists, technicians and animal care personnel.  Experienced researchers, by 
their behaviour, must set examples of responsible action and respect for the animals.  In 
addition, they should establish clearly defined lines of communication and modes of contact 





There are two important limitations to the system set out here which are common to all 
systems of grading or assessment so far proposed.  They arise because of the communication 
and experiential discontinuities between humans and other animals which accompany all 
human-animal interactions. 
 
(1) Humankind is at present unable to communicate directly with other animals or to 
understand fully how their sensory world is affected by what we do around them, or to 
them, and how they interpret and react to these intrusions. 
 
(2) We necessarily use our human experience to anticipate the impact of our intrusions 
on other animals, and describe that impact in terms which are meaningful to us but 
which may have poor relevance to the animals' actual perceptions, sensations or 
concerns. 
 
We acknowledge these limitations here to highlight the difficulty of understanding fully the 
life experiences (good and bad) of other animals.  However, these obstacles should not deter 
us from our present purpose because they attend all of our interactions with other animals 
and not simply those in the research environment.  In all spheres we can only continue to 
interact with other animals using the best devices available, however flawed they may be. 
 
 
ANIMAL WELFARE/WELL-BEING IN THE RESEARCH ENVIRONMENT 
 
Good welfare/well-being is the state of being manifest in an animal when its nutritional, 
environmental, health, behavioural and mental needs are met. 
 
It is imperative that we strive for the highest standards of animal welfare in the research 
environment, not only because of our ethical responsibility to the animals we use, but also 
because of our responsibility to the community in which we work.  We are accountable to that 
community and we must be seen by that community to behave in a caring and disciplined 
manner.  If we are to continue in our researches, we need to retain its respect. 
 
An important part of retaining that respect in to be seen to be operating transparent systems 
honestly and openly.  Nowhere is this more important than in our assessments of the impact 
of our experimental procedures on our experimental animals, our justifications for carrying 
out those procedures and the cost-benefit decisions we make.  It is awareness of this need 
which has motivated this paper. 
 
In the authors' view assessment of the impact of the experimental procedures in the 
keystone.  The efficiency and accuracy of those assessments should be improved by use of the 
system based on the five domains of welfare/well-being compromise described here.  Although 
at present the indices used in the five domains may be imprecise or precise, qualitative or 
quantitative, controversial or established, they do provide the best means we have at hand to 
grade the severity of compromise likely to be or actually caused by an experiment.  That 
severity sets the strength and stringency of the justification which must be advanced before 
an experiment should proceed. 
 
It is the research worker who plays the leading role in the process, who conceives and designs 
the proposed experiment, assesses its negative impact on the subjects, looks for ways to 
reduce that impact, assembles the justification, attempts the first cost-benefit analysis and 
then takes the case to the institutional Animal Ethics Committee.  The conscientiousness 
and comprehensiveness of the assessments of compromise and the actions taken to minimise 
it are measures of the researcher's acceptance of ethical responsibility for all features of each 
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Table 1: The Five Freedoms (FAWC, 1992) 
              
 
  Freedom      How promoted 
              
 
1.  Freedom from thirst, hunger and malnutrition. By ready access to fresh water and a diet  
to maintain full health and vigour. 
 
2.  Freedom from discomfort. By providing an appropriate environment, 
including shelter and a comfortable resting 
area. 
 
3.  Freedom from pain, injury and disease. By prevention or rapid diagnosis and 
treatment. 
 
4.  Freedom to express normal behaviour. By providing sufficient space, proper 
facilities and company of the animal's own 
kind. 
 
5.  Freedom from fear and distress. By ensuring conditions which avoid 
mental suffering. 
        
 
 
Table 2: Descriptions and examples of grades on the severity scale for the five 
domains of potential welfare compromise. 
             
Domain 1: Thirst/hunger/malnutrition 
 
Grade  O Water/fluid is available in quantities which satisfy thirst. 
 
 Food of appropriate types and compositions for the species is made available in 
amounts which meet body maintenance requirements plus any additional 
demands imposed by factors such as pregnancy, lactation, growth, exercise, 
thermal challenge or recuperation from illness or injury. 
 
 For instance: animals kept outdoors eating their usual food in appropriate 
amounts; grazing trials on treated pastures; offering supplements to naturally 
available food; provision of complete, balanced rations to meet all nutritional 
requirements of animals maintained indoors. 
 
Grade A Water/fluid or food restrictions or excesses which cause minor, readily reversed 
effects on physiological state, body condition or performance. 
 
 For instance: water priming for kidney function tests; short-term overall food 
intake restrictions or excesses which are within usual tolerance levels for the 
species; short-term changes in dietary composition which cause no clinical 
symptoms of deficiency or toxicity, but which would cause such symptoms in 
the longer term. 
 
Grade B Water/fluid or food restrictions or excesses which cause serious short-term or 
moderate long-term effects on physiological state, body condition or performance, 
but such effects remain within the capacity of the body to respond to nutritional 
variations and allow spontaneous recovery after the restoration of a good quality 
diet at the required intakes. 
 
 For instance: simulation of usual overall intake restrictions often experienced 
by pregnant/lactating ruminants during cold winters or drought; dietary 
induction of milk fever in cattle; induction of mild deficiency or toxicity 
symptoms by feeding diets containing inadequate or excessive amounts of 
essential nutrients. 
 
Grade C Water/fluid or food restrictions or excesses which lead to levels of debility where 
euthanasia would be used to avoid an inevitable further decline because therapy 
would either be ineffective or too protracted. 
 
 For instance: dietary induction of advanced pregnancy toxaemia in sheep or of 
ketosis in dairy cattle; dietary induction of advanced symptoms of nutrient 
deficiency or excess; severe deleterious effects of dietary toxins. 
 
Grade X Water/fluid or food restrictions or excesses where the predicted end point is 
death. 
 
 For instance: experiments which cause animals to die from dehydration or 
starvation, nutrient excess or deficiency, or poisoning by toxins in the diet. 





              
Domain 2: Environmental challenge 
 
Grade O Experiments involving outdoor or indoor environmental conditions which elicit body 
responses that remain inside the animals' capacity to react to external stimuli 
without recourse to adaptive physiological changes. 
 
 For instance: ambient conditions which are within the thermoneutral range; 
reduced barometric pressures which do not cause increases in red blood cell 
production. 
 
Grade A Experiments which cause body responses that remain within the homeostatic 
capacity of the animals to react but involve adaptive physiological responses. 
 
 For instance: exposure to levels of cold or heat which are outside the 
thermoneutral range, or barometric pressures which increase red blood cell 
production, but which remain within the capacity of the animals to adapt and 
do not lead to debility in the long term. 
 
Grade B Experiments which represent marked short-term or moderate long-term 
environmental challenges that elicit body responses beyond the physiological 
adaptive capacity of the animals, but where the untoward effects are readily 
reversed by restoration of benign conditions with or without additional therapeutic 
intervention. 
 
 For instance: short-term exposure to severe of cold or heat which would lead to 
collapse if prolonged. 
 
Grade C Experiments which represent extreme environmental challenges that lead to 
serious physiological compromise, where euthanasia would be used to prevent an 
inevitable further decline or because therapeutic procedures would be ineffecitve or 
too protracted. 
 
 For instance: prolonged exposure to severe cold which would lead to failure of 
thermoregulation and collapse, but the exposure is terminated just before 
those outcomes. 
 
Grade X Environmental experiments which cause protracted extreme physiological 
compromise or where the end point is death. 
 
 For instance: exposure to lethal extremes of cold, heat or barometric pressure. 





              
Domain 3: Disease/injury/functional impairment 
 
Grade O Experiments with healthy animals which do not cause or involve disease, injury or 
functional impairment. 
 
 For instance: studies of healthy uninjured animals which are kept in physical 
conditions which do not themselves lead to injuries such as lameness or 
compression sores; studies to estsablish normal characteristics of healthy 
animals. 
 
Grade A Experiments which cause body responses that remain within the homeostatic 
capacity of the animals to react with no or only minor debility or incapacity. 
 
 For instance: studies of vaccines using killed pathogens; tuberculosis tests; 
induction of mild fever without other debilitating effects; induction of 
subclinical parasitism; healing of minor superficial incisions, cuts or wounds; 
minor surgical and/or pharmacological modification of homeostatic capacity 
(e.g. creation of non-obstructive gut fistulae; splenectomy; endocrine gland 
removal with complete hormone replacement therapy); physical conditions 
which cause minor and transient lameness, compression sores or abrasions. 
 
Grade B Experiments which cause marked short-term or moderate long-term functional 
changes associated with moderate debility or incapacity, but from which complete 
recovery occurs spontaneously or can be readily effected therapeutically. 
 
 For instance: studies of live vaccines; induction of clinical parasitism; induction 
of mild reversible infectious diarrhoea; moderate surgical and/or 
pharmacological modification to homeostatic capacity (e.g. limited gut resection; 
endocrine gland removal with delayed or incomplete hormone replacement 
therapy); physical conditions which cause minor chronic lameness or other 
injuries. 
 
Grade C Experiments which cause marked debility or incapacity and serious physiological 
compromise, where euthanasia would be used to prevent an inevitable further 
decline because therapeutic procedures would be ineffective or too protracted.  
Experiments which cause death unpredictably in a small proportion of animals 
because a rapid deterioration in their state can occur with little or no warning. 
 
 For instance: studies of severe facial exczema; induction of severe diarrhoea or 
severe infectious pneumonia; protracted or irreversible pharmacological 
modification of homeostatic capacity (e.g. chemical induction of diabetes 
mellitus without replacement therapy); marked surgical modification of 
homeostatic capacity (e.g. extensive gut resection; cutting of sensory or motor 
nerves serving large areas of the body; precise lesioning of limited areas of the 
brain but with intervention before collapse); physical conditions which cause 
moderate chronic lameness or other injuries. 
 
Grade X Experiments in conscious animals which cause extreme debility or incapacity or 
where the predicted end point is an unpleasant death. 
 
 For instance: studies of biological or other methods for killing pest animals; 
toxicity testing using the traditional LD 50 test;  evaluation of vaccines where 
death is the measure of failure to protect; studies of the pathogenesis of fatal 
diseases caused by infectious or toxic agents; studies of recovery from third 
degree burns or serious traumatic injuries. 








              
Domain 4: Behavioural/interactive restriction 
 
Grade O Experiments which do not interfere with the behavioural needs of individuals or 
groups of animals (an animal's behavioural needs being those activities which 
when thwarted produce untoward physiological or psychological effects). 
 
 For instance: studies of wild or undomesticated animals in their natural 
habitats; field studies of domesticated animals. 
 
Grade A Experiments which cause minor interference with the behavioural needs of 
individuals or groups of animals. 
 
 For instance: mild and short-term physical restraint; keeping free-range 
domesticated animals in a yard; operant conditioning with positive 
reinforcement in barren laboratory environments; benign preference tests in 
unnatural surroundings. 
 
Grade B Experiments which cause marked short-term or moderate long-term interference 
with the behavioural needs of individuals or groups of animals resulting in 
untoward physiological or psychological effects which are readily reversed by the 
restoration of benign conditions with or without additional therapeutic 
intervention. 
 
 For instance: medium-term restrictions of instinctive behaviour; medium-term 
holding of ruminants in a metabolism crate; long-term restraint leading to the 
development of reversible steriotypies; changing social group composition. 
 
Grade C Experiments which markedly interfere with the behavioural needs of individuals or 
groups of animals leading to severe physiological or psychological compromise 
requiring restoration of benign conditions, with or without additional therapeutic 
intervention, or the use of euthanasia to limit the magnitude or duration, or both, of 
the imposed compromise. 
 
 For instance: application of marked and repeated noxious stimuli from which 
escape is impossible; prolonged periods (several hours or more) of close physical 
restraint; induction of aggressive behaviour leading to self-mutilation or 
excessive intraspecific aggression; marked alterations to the perceptual or 
motor functions of animals to test consequent behaviour. 
 
Grade X Experiments which cause severe interference with the behavioural needs of 
individuals or groups of animals leading to psychotic-like behaviour or to agonistic 
interactions that result in severe injury or death. 
 
 Such states might manifest as profound withdrawal, agitation, self-mutilation 
or aggression towards others caused by social deprivation, prolonged exposure 
to an impoverished environment, excessive physical confinement or restraint, 
over-crowding, exposure to severe noxious stimuli, maternal deprivation with 
substitution of punitive surrogates and the like. 





              
Domain 5: Anxiety/fear/pain/distress* 
 
Grade O Experiments which do not cause anxiety, fear, pain or distress such as non-
invasive observation of animals in unchallenging circumstances. 
 
 For instance: field observations of grazing behaviour on farms, or benign 
handling of tamed and trained animals which are familiar with all personnel 
and procedures and with the place where the procedures are conducted. 
 
Grade A Experiments which cause minor discomfort or low-level anxiety or apprehension for 
short periods. 
 
 For instance: experiments on completely anaesthetised animals which do not 
regain consciousness; standard methods of euthanasia that rapidly induce 
unconsciousness, (e.g. anaesthetic overdose); simple venipuncture or 
venisection; injection of non-toxic substances; skin tests which cause low-level 
irritation without ulceration; feeding trained animals by orogastric tube; 
movement of free-range domesticated animals to unfamiliar housing. 
 
Grade B Experiments which cause moderate anxiety, fear, pain, or distress for short 
periods or minor discomfort or distress for long periods. 
 
 For instance: recovery from major surgeries like thorocotomy, orthopaedic 
procedures, hysterectomy or gall bladder removal, with effective use of 
analgesics; surgical procedures on conscious animals but with the use of local 
anaesthesia and systemic analgesic; movement of excitable free-range 
domesticated livestock to unfamiliar housing. 
 
Grade C Experiments which cause marked anxiety, fear, pain or distress where any 
suffering caused is ended by euthanasia or by therapeutic or other interventions 
before it becomes excessive or where the suffering is short-lived and complete 
recovery can occur.  Experiments which cause moderate anxiety, fear, pain or 
distress for long periods. 
 
 For instance: recovery from major surgery without the use of analgesics;  
marked social or environmental deprivation; capture, handling, restraint or 
housing, without the use of tranquilisers, of wild or semi-domesticated animals 
that exhibit marked flight responses. 
 
Grade X Experiments which cause severe, inescapable or unrelieved anxiety, fear, pain or 
distress where the intensity or duration, or both, of the induced suffering are at or 
beyond the limits of reasonable endurance. 
 
 For instance: conducting major surgeries without the use of anaesthesia (e.g. 
where the animal is immobilised physically or with muscle relaxants); testing 
the efficacy of analgesics in animals with induced severe pain. 
 
             
 *Outcomes of experiments which focus on the first four domains will often 
contribute to the grading in the fifth domain (see Figure 5). 
Table 3: Level of ethical cost and required justification for experiments at each 
grade of the severity scale. 
             
 
Grade O` Ethical cost - nil or virtually nil. 
 
 Such experiments would not usually require justificaion in terms of expected 
indirect or direct benefits to humans, other animals or both. 
 
Grade A Ethical cost - low. 
 
 Such experiments would require justification regarding the expected indirect or 
direct benefits to humans, other animals or both. 
 
Grade B Ethical cost - moderate. 
 
 Such experiments would require good justification regarding the expected 
direct benefits to humans, other animals or both. 
 
Grade C Ethical cost - high. 
 
 Such experiments would require strong justification regarding the expected 
direct benefits to humans, other animals or both. 
 
Grade X Ethical cost - very high. 
 
 Such experiments would require the most exceptional justification and would 
be permitted only very rarely. 
             
 
Figure 1. The three dimensions of science. 
 
Figure 2. (a)  The health-illness continuum. 
 (b)  The health-illness continuum with a health focus, 
 (c)  The health illness continuum with an illness focus. 
 
Figure 3. Different degrees of health-illness at different positions on the continuum. 
 
Figure 4. (a)  The welfare-suffering continuum. 
 (b)  The welfare-suffering continuum with a welfare focus. 
 (c)  Different degrees of welfare-suffering at different positions on the continuum. 
 
Figure 5. The five domains of potential welfare compromise.  Compromise in domains 1-4 
will usually be registered in welfare terms in domain 5 which represents the 
components of suffering. 
 
Figure 6. Schematic presentation of cost benefit decisions which must balance the grades 
of anticipated welfare compromise (O, A, B, C, X) and the necessary strength of 
justification required (see Table 3) before an experiment could proceed. 
 
 
